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Membership of Chinese Farmer Specialized Cooperatives and Direct Subsidies for 
Farmer Households: A Multi-Province Data Study 
JINHUA ZHANG, JUNJIE WU1, JUSTINE SIMPSON, CLEMENT LAMBOI ARTHUR 
Abstract: The introduction of direct subsidies to farming households and the development of 
farmer cooperatives has provided two important approaches to China’s twenty-first century 
food policy challenges. However, research undertaken largely separates and focuses on 
subsidies or cooperatives. This neglects their interaction and complementarities. This paper 
seeks to rectify this omission using a survey from 35 farmer specialized cooperatives (FSCs) 
and 561 farming households in 16 provinces, based on a two-stage treatment effect model. The 
findings suggest FSCs have become important organizations that improve farmers’ net income. 
Moreover, usage of agricultural machinery and direct subsidies also result in higher net 
income, though they have little impact on farmers’ machinery investment. The results provide 
an evidence source that contributes to debate concerning government subsidy policy. Policy 
may act more like an income transfer program, since it has little impact on farmers’ investment 
in agriculture. The study also highlights that there are complementary effects between FSCs 
and direct subsidies, and that China’s cooperative policy integrated with direct subsidies could 
be progressive. 
Keywords: Farmer Specialised Cooperatives (FSCs), agricultural subsidies, farmers’ net 
income, agricultural development, China.   
JEL: O13, P21, Q01, Q18 
Food security is a key issue for any nation. Agriculture therefore is a core policy issue for any 
government and this extends to the role of subsidies to farming households and policies 
supportive of cooperatives (Yi et al. 2015; Zheng et al. 2012; OECD 2009). Contemporary 
China confronts a particular tension in terms of food security because rapid urbanization has 
caused a significant decrease in the farming population and has threatened sustainable 
agricultural development (Carter et al. 2012; Tian and Zhou 2011). Geographically, China 
has less than 0.4 hectares per capita of agricultural land, of which a minority is arable (less 
than 0.09 hectares per capita). However, China is home to around 1.4 billion people, almost 
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20% of the world population. The Chinese state is thus highly sensitized to the need to 
support the agricultural sector.  
Since 2003/2004, direct subsidies to farming households have become a key component in 
China’s national agricultural development policy. A subsidy may contribute to income or 
productive capacity or both, and this has in turn created scope for research. Huang et al.’s (2013) 
fieldwork clearly establishes that contemporary subsidies to farming households in China have 
been significant, proportional to agricultural GDP, and, as subsidies flow to rural households 
as recipients, one can reasonably infer generalized benefits in terms of income effects. Huang 
et al.’s study also tracks increasing total value of output for grains (rice, wheat and corn) and 
soybeans, from which one can infer some degree of positive association between output (at 
least by value) and subsidies. However, as Huang et al. (2011) also make clear, institutional 
frictions have reduced the effectiveness of subsidies. For example, the dominant grains subsidy 
has been distributed on the basis of longstanding contracted land areas, and so has flowed to 
named contractees, rather than the farmer currently planting on this land (Kirwan 2008; Huang 
et al. 2011). As such, the subsidy has created more of a generalized income effect than a direct 
output effect (its impact seems to be distorted or dissipated). The issue remains an important 
one in terms of evolving contexts. 
Contemporary farmer specialized cooperatives (FSCs) began to emerge in the 1980s as a 
solution to problems confronted by the introduction of markets for farm produce, initially 
pioneered by an echelon of better connected and relatively wealthy farmers (Liang and 
Hendrikse 2013). These cooperatives were voluntary mutual aid organizations and so can be 
clearly differentiated from former forced collectivization, characteristic of the 1950s-1960s 
(see Zheng et al. 2012). However, the new cooperatives were in turn hampered by the absence 
of a legal framework that could encourage dissemination of these organizations through the 
clarification of rights and obligations, and by improving awareness of the potential of this new 
organizational form (Chan and Ip 2014a, 2014b). Despite the absence of a framework, local 
government began to promote farmer cooperatives in the 1990s and this culminated in 1998 in 
a Directive from the State Council providing national recognition and support for them. This 
was followed in 2002 by a Ministry of Agriculture pilot scheme, which focused on 100 FSCs 
in order to develop a legal framework. As such, the state began to take a formal interest in 
farmer cooperatives, at around the same time as the policy of direct subsidies to farming 
households was being developed. In 2004, Zhejiang Province passed the first provincial law to 
regulate FSCs and this, in conjunction with the pilot scheme, was then used as the basis for the 
national Farmers’ Specialised Cooperative Law, which came into effect in July 2007. The 
implementation of the new law clearly provided a significant impetus to the growth of 
cooperatives. 
The direct subsidy policy and the Farmers’ Specialised Cooperative Law have long since been 
implemented (as of 2018, 14 and 11 years respectively). However little research has been 
focused on the possible scope for complementarities between these two policies. Huang et al.’s 
(2013) work, was focused overwhelmingly on subsidies and they acknowledged that one 
limitation of their research was that it put aside other important issues such as membership of 
a farmer specialised cooperative (FSC). Zheng et al.’s (2012) prior work explores factors 
affecting participation in FSCs, but focuses only on this. Moreover, their data derives only from 
Jilin Province. 
The purpose of our paper is to assess the role of cooperatives as a complement to work 
undertaken on direct subsidies (i.e. the complementarity between these two polices). We do so 
using multi-province data. To achieve this aim, we collected 561 farmer household surveys 
across 16 provinces, covering 35 FSCs and using a group of non-FSC members as a control 
group. The survey data focuses on three issues: (1) factors affecting farmer’s participation in 
FSCs; (2) the net income effects of FSCs membership and direct subsidies for farmers; (3) the 
impact of membership and direct subsidies on investment in agricultural inputs and use of 
machinery. Since much of the research on FSCs tends to be more localized, our construction 
of the data covering a range of provinces allows us to extend the prior focus and extent of the 
aforementioned research.  
Our findings have important policy implications concerning the integration and the 
development of cooperatives and agricultural direct subsidies. Overall, they provide further 
empirical support for the argument that effective integration of cooperatives with direct 
subsidies is likely to be a positive policy combination, especially if also combined with 
structural reform in the agricultural sector. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
2 provides a brief overview of the emergence of FSCs and new subsidies policies; Section 3 
introduces the data and model, Section 4 sets out the empirical results and analysis, and in 
Section 5, we conclude with a brief discussion of the policy implications.   
Context: The emergence of FSCs and new subsidies policies 
Agriculture is a critical sector for China (Cai and Du 2006). China has 7% of the world’s 
cultivated land feeding nearly a quarter of the world’s population. Agricultural development is 
thus a priority for the Chinese government historically and contemporarily. The epithet "Food 
is the first thing for people" (min yi shi wei tian) captures an enduring concern in Chinese 
civilization. Agricultural taxes and subsidies, have been frequently used by China’s 
governments over a period of 2500 years. However, government rarely intervened to encourage 
the formation of farmer organizations prior to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) coming to 
power in 1949. A fragmented small farming economy was previously characteristic of Chinese 
agriculture. Since 1949, farmer organization and agricultural subsidy policies have been closely 
associated and have been key policies, even though dominant political concerns have been 
focused elsewhere.  
To expedite rapid industrialisation, partly emulating the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics,) the CCP initiated a heavy industry-oriented development strategy from 1950, 
creating state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This resulted in a rapid expansion of the urban 
population and great demand for agricultural output. Grain self-sufficiency and state-
monopolized grain procurement became core concerns. In addition, to support industrial 
development, the Chinese government collected agricultural taxes from individual farmers, 
which accounted for around 40% of total national taxation. However, support for agriculture 
in the form of machinery and subsidies was limited (Chen and Zhu 2012). The development of 
the industrial infrastructure at that time was at the expense of agricultural development and 
farmers’ interests.  
Beginning in the 1950s, in accordance with socialist ideological tenets, the CCP began to 
introduce collective farming. Farmers were initially persuaded to voluntarily join small farming 
teams. Policy, however, quickly became more pressured and then coercive. The late 1950’s 
witnessed a rapid switch to ‘People’s Communes’, each containing about 5,000 households, 
10,000 labourers and 10,000 acres of cultivated land (Lin 1997). As has been well documented 
‘People’s Communes’ were a political and practical disaster. Farmers suffered within large 
bureaucratic organizations that espoused equal distribution policies but generated a variety of 
unintended consequences and oppressions. As a result, per capita grain output was consistently 
low. Problems were compounded by the Great Leap Forward in which approximately 30 
million people died from starvation and malnutrition between 1959 and 1961 (Lin 1990, 1993). 
Though People’s Communes were not formally abolished at this time, farmer organizations 
subsequently tacitly devolved to smaller unit sizes called ‘Production Teams’, which consisted 
of about 20-30 neighbouring households (Lin 1997). 
Then in 1978, the CCP, following a spontaneous set of events in Anhui province, began to 
introduce some market based agricultural reforms, as well as broader economic reforms (the 
socialist market economy). In the agricultural sector, an incremental and experimental 
approach was implemented. To secure a substantial increase in agricultural output, a shift from 
the collective farming system to a household based farming system began in 1979 (completed 
1984) (Lin 1997). This was named the ‘Household Responsibility System’. The policy resulted 
in a sharp increase in grain output. However, agricultural reform within the command economy 
proceeded more slowly, but gradually extended from: (1) a gradual increase in grain 
procurement prices; (2) reductions in basic quota compulsory procurement, balanced by an 
above quota premium price; (3) a switch from mandatory quota procurement to contract 
procurement. Still, the grain procurement system was retained until the late 1980s, by which 
time the marketized system was more diverse and capacity had improved. In the 1990s, the 
government carried out further reforms, including protecting grain prices via subsidies. For 
example, price subsidies for grain, cotton and vegetable oil significantly increased from 26.76 
billion yuan (RMB) in 1990 to 75.87 billion yuan (RMB) in 2000 (Chen and Zhu 2012). The 
agricultural machinery purchase subsidy was also added (He et al. 2010). Subsequent grain 
output growth was generally greater than population growth. However, more rapid economic 
reform outside the agricultural sector ultimately drove the government to adopt new legislation 
and deeper reforms in agricultural policy from the late 1990s. 
After two decades of economic growth, the share of agriculture in GDP dramatically reduced 
from 35% in 1970 down to 15% in 2004. However, thought this is typical of transitional 
development states it also created real disruptions. In the 2000s, the attractiveness of industrial 
and service based urban employment led to a rural outward migration problem and reflected 
an increasing rural–urban income gap.2 The total agricultural population fell from 82% in 1978 
to 50% in the late 2000s (NBSC 2004-2009; cited in Deng et al. 2010). This migration 
cumulatively (and despite that much of the migration was ostensibly temporary and seasonal) 
resulted in an aging and female dominated rural population, characterised by lower skills and 
levels of education (in turn creating problems of both numbers and current capabilities for the 
implementation of farming reforms; modern management and technology use, supply chain 
awareness etc). The Chinese state came to recognize these as a source of crisis expressed 
through the ‘three agricultural issues’: farmers (nong min), countryside (nong cun) and 
agriculture (nong ye). Solving problems for each was recognized as necessary to achieve long 
term grain security and agricultural sustainability.   
FSCs developed in this context (Zhao and Yuan 2014). FSCs built on skills and practices 
provided by a small proportion of middle class farmers, who had acquired substantial assets 
and social capital from the economic reforms, many of whom had exploited networks of 
connections to benefit from the reform process (via work at local government agricultural 
departments and positioning in new supply chains etc) (Zhao 2006; Liang and Hendrikse 2013). 
Beginning in the 1980s, these farmers organized cooperative-like activities to connect buyers 
and sellers. FSCs capitalised on the experience of these farmers and many of them became core 
members of the new FSCs in the 1990s (Liang and Hendrikse 2013). Importantly, unlike 
2 Rural migrant numbers reached 225.42 million in 2008 (NBSC 2009; cited in Gui et al. 2012), of which most 
are educated young people who were attracted by higher income, living styles and life prospects in urban cities. 
collectivist movements in the past, the new FSCs were driven by entrepreneurial farmers able 
to connect to both business and government (Xu et al. 2013).  
FSCs brought together scattered small-scale farmer households, allowing economies of scale 
to be achieved, and increasing bargaining power with buyers, whilst reducing transaction costs 
(Taubmann et al. 2003; Zheng et al. 2011). Realising the potential, the government began to 
adopt supportive strategies and policies. As briefly noted in the introduction, in 1998, a 
Directive was issued by the State Council to declare government support for FSCs as a 
voluntary initiative. In 2002 the Ministry of Agriculture launched a 100 FSC pilot scheme 
across China to obtain experience to help prepare for legislation. In November 2004, Zhejiang 
Province passed the first provincial law to regulate the operation of FSCs. Using the local law 
as a reference, the 10th National People's Congress issued the national ‘Farmers’ Specialised 
Cooperative Law’ in October 2006, which came into effect on 1st July 2007. Later the national 
Agricultural Law was amended to incorporate this new legislation. With legal protection and 
active government sponsorship, the numbers of FSCs grew rapidly. For example, the number 
registered with local government agriculture offices increased from 100,000 in 2008 (Yan and 
Chen 2013) to 15,310,000 in 2015.3 The latter figure constitutes 42% of farmers in China.  
The shift to support for FSCs was accompanied by changes in the policy context for, and 
dependence on, agricultural taxes (Wang and Cai 2004). Agricultural tax revenue was no longer 
significant, falling from 11% in 1970 to 3.7% in 2004 (NBSC 2005; cited in Meng 2012). 
Joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 required China to gradually comply with 
international rules and practices. Moreover, industrial and service led economic growth 
provided a platform for the Chinese government to invest more in agriculture and rethink its 
approach to subsidies.   
In 2004 China began to phase out agricultural taxes and this was completed by 2006. 
Meanwhile, agricultural subsidy policy was reformed (Gale 2009; Zheng et al. 2013.). Reform 
included three main features: (1) a significant increase in the total value of subsidies; (2) a 
switch from indirect subsidies via procurement prices to a direct cash transfer into individual 
farmer’s dedicated bank accounts; (3) the introduction of new subsidy categories and 
eligibilities.4 However, since 2016 there has been some reconsolidation of subsidy categories 
to ensure a more coherent system.5 Total agricultural subsidies steadily increased from 14.5 
3 http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-03/21/c_128819262.htm 
4 The four main general categories introduced (with subcategories in each) have been: ‘grain subsidy’ (liangshi 
butie), ‘comprehensive (aggregated) input subsidy’ (nongzi zonghe butie), ‘quality seed subsidy’ (liangzhong 
butie) and ‘agricultural machinery subsidy’ (nongjiju butie). 
5  ‘grain subsidy’, ‘comprehensive (aggregated) input subsidy’, and ‘quality seed subsidy’ have since been 
combined and are now termed the ‘agriculture support and protection subsidy’. 
billion RMB yuan in 2004 to 123.1 billion yuan in 2009 (Meng 2012).6 This increased again 
to 140.5 billion in 2016.7  
The brief contextualizing overview provided here indicates that agriculture has become a less 
significant part of China’s overall economy in GDP and developmental terms, but that the 
government has increasingly recognized the need to support and develop its agricultural sector. 
There are many points one might make here regarding social cohesion and stability, 
sustainability, and future food security. However, one important empirical issue is the degree 
to which cooperatives policy and subsidies policy have been successful, and the degree to 
which these two can or could complement each other, since given the actual profile of China’s 
farming sector effective policy along these axes creates scope to pursue goals such as those just 
stated. Our study contributes along these lines.  
Bearing in mind that there have been few studies of cooperatives and subsidies and that they 
have been either restricted to a single Province or focused on cooperatives or subsidies, our 
aim was to assess what affects whether farmers participate in FSCs and to provide bridging 
analysis of the degree to which availability and access to subsidies influenced FSC participation, 
whilst comparing any benefits with non-FSC farmers.   
Data and methods 
As stated in the introduction: the purpose of our paper is to assess the role of cooperatives as a 
complement to work undertaken on direct subsidies (i.e. the complementarity between these 
two polices). We do so using multi-province data. To achieve this aim, we collected 561 farmer 
household surveys across 16 provinces, covering 35 FSCs and using a group of non-FSC 
members as a control group. The survey data focuses on three issues: (1) factors affecting 
farmer’s participation in FSCs; (2) the net income effects of FSCs membership and direct 
subsidies for farmers; (3) the impact of membership and direct subsidies on investment in 
agricultural inputs and use of machinery. Since much of the research on FSCs tends to be more 
localized, our construction of the data covering a range of provinces allows us to extend the 
prior focus and extent of previous research.8  
6 The subsidies as a proportion of agricultural output was increased in the same period from 0.7% in 2004 to 3.47% 
in 2009. 
7 http://nys.mof.gov.cn/zxzyzf/nyzcbhbtzj/201607/t20160719_2363887.html 
8 However, as with any piece of research, ours too has a series of limitations: (1) our sample focuses mainly on 
cash crop FSCs with omission of others; (2) the sample does not distinguish different varieties of subsidy, but 
rather relies on the standardized national distribution of those subsidies; (3) though we maintain that the our survey 
is geographically more extensive than previous research, the use of selected and trained students to deliver the 
survey does restrict the timing of that research to particular periods in the year. 
Data overview 
In order to achieve a geographically balanced sample 9to assess the regional differences in 
farmers’ participation in cooperatives, benefits received from membership of FSCs and 
agricultural subsidies, 16 provinces/autonomous regions/ municipalities were selected.  
This included 6 from the eastern area, 5 from the central area, and 5 from the western area. 
Their macroeconomic figures are listed below (see Table 1). The coverage can be viewed in 
the Map of China in Figure 1.  
Table 1 Selected agricultural related macroeconomic facts in sample provinces (2010) 
Region 










Net income per 
farmer 
household (Yuan) 
Hebei (HB) 2.83 21.13 55.50 5958 
Shandong (SD) 4.09 16.98 50.30 6990.3 
Jiangsu (JS) 5.26 10.37 38.24 9118.2 
Zhejiang (ZJ) 5.09 7.84 38.37 11302.6 
Fujian (FJ) 3.99 15.66 42.89 7426.9 
Hainan (HN) 2.38 39.78 50.17 5275.4 
Eastern average 3.94 18.63 45.91 7678.57 
Inner Mongolia 
(NMG) 4.72 
15.80 44.50 5529.6 
Henan (HeN) 2.46 24.83 61.50 5523.7 
Anhui (AH) 2.07 23.91 56.99 5285.2 
Jiangxi (JX) 2.12 20.11 55.94 5788.6 
Hunan (HuN) 2.44 23.62 56.70 5622 
Central average 2.76 21.65 55.13 5549.82 
Shanxi (S’X) 2.71 16.46 54.24 4105 
Gansu (GS) 1.61 25.65 63.87 3424.7 
Sichuan (SC) 2.14 23.75 59.81 5086.9 
Guizhou (GZ) 1.32 21.68 66.20 3471.9 
Yunnan (YN) 1.57 25.06 65.30 3952 
Western average 1.87 22.52 61.88 4008.10 
9 In other word, we selected the sample generally and proportionally based on the numbers of FSCs in different 
provinces. For example, Eastern China has the highest numbers of FSCs compared to those in Central and Western 
areas, our sample was thus selected to reflect the shape. However, some provinces have not been included due to 
data unavailability.  
Figure 1:  Regional coverage in the surveyed sample 
The agricultural population in Table 1 refers to China’s register system of identifying citizens 
(Hukou). It shows that the proportion of the agricultural population as a percentage of the total 
population, and agricultural outputs as a percentage of GDP are higher in less developed 
regions than in more developed regions (e.g. western comparing to eastern and central, central 
comparing to eastern). In addition to these macroeconomic figures, Table 2 further lists some 
figures relating to farmers’ average earnings and average agricultural income across the three 
regions. As such, Tables 1 and 2 collectively suggest that our sample covers regions with 
different levels of agricultural development, i.e. in terms of net income per farmer household, 
average farmer earnings and agricultural income, the eastern area is the most developed region 
whereas the western is the least developed region.   
Table 2:  Differences of average farmer wage and agricultural income from regions in the surveyed 
sample (Yuan) 
Questionnaires were used to collect data during the period of Chinese New Year in 2014. Since 
China Agricultural University has a student population covering the relevant regions and 
provinces and both students and others typically return home for the Spring Festival (chun jie) 
winter holiday periods a dependence on targeted students for delivery was both convenient and 
effective.10 The latter involved several considerations: 1) students from China Agricultural 
University grew up in an agricultural environment and so were familiar with the context and 
issues being surveyed; 2) as students at a high ranking university they were also familiar with 
academic and research protocols enabling them to follow a standard research procedure; and 3) 
perhaps most importantly, each student knew the respondents well and thus had a position of 
familiarity and trust that could expedite effective clarification of the questionnaire to ensure 
consistency.  
In accordance with the above, a training workshop was provided for the students before their 
departure. As such, it is reasonable to suggest a priori that every effort was made to ensure the 
data collection process did not impair data quality. We aimed to achieve a target that in each 
village visited, data collection should include 15 FSC member households from 1 or 2 FSCs 
and 5 non FSC member households whose agricultural production was similar to their FSC 
member counterparts. After excluding invalid questionnaires, respondent coverage consisted 
of 35 FSCs, and 561 households, disaggregating to 481 FSC members and 80 non-FSC 
members (see Table 3).  
10 Migrant farmers refer to heads of farmer households who work full time in another place and left other 
family members engaged in agriculture or rent their farmland to others. During this period, most farmer 
migrants go back rural villages for Chinese New Year from urban cities so that we can capture them in the 
survey.   





















Eastern 4965.5 4234.6 4287.3 3889.2 3447.8 3471.8 2954.6 3189.1 2659.3 3055.9 
Central 3014.5 3714.7 2558.6 3390.3 2047.0 2984.0 1731.5 2669.9 1575.4 2556.1 
Western 2203.6 2598.3 1892.4 2318.4 1483.2 2043.6 1200.8 1808.6 1070.4 1749.8 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for cooperatives and farmers in the sample 
Table 3 also indicates that the sample achieved a balance in terms of typical FSC types (i.e. 
Livestock, poultry and fishery, and Crop FSCs) across three regions. We would, therefore, 
claim that the survey is representative. This includes in terms of farmer classification (full time 
farmers are the largest group, followed by part time and migrant categories respectively). 
Clearly, given the actual numbers engaged in farming in China there is always some question 
mark regarding sampling. As exploratory research based on an identified gap, our work is 
intended as progress (greater geographical coverage, addressing both aspects of the agricultural 
problem at issue – membership and subsidies). It should be read in this context.   
The model and variables 
We are interested in 3 areas of analysis and these are reflected in the questionnaire: 
(1) the factors affecting farmer membership of FSCs;
(2) the impacts of FSC membership and direct subsidies on farmers’ net income;
(3) the impacts of FSC membership and direct subsidies on the use of agricultural inputs and
machinery. 
Our data is initially broken down into 18 variables within 4 categories: 
(1) characteristics affecting farmers’ participation (level of education, years of farming
experience, full time or part time farmers, and being a member of FSC or only having 
knowledge on FSCs);  
(2) characteristics relating to farming business activity (type of FSCs, access to finance, value
of agricultural inputs and farm machinery, etc.); 
(3) a proxy of the level of local economic development with average house value and
geographical locations (Eastern, Central etc.); 
(4) farmer households receiving direct agricultural subsidies or not (a proxy of government
support). 
Region 



















No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Eastern 6 (35) 6 (33) 126 (40) 101 (80) 12 (32) 239 (50) 24 (67) 18 (67) 12 (70) 54 (67) 
Central 6 (35) 6 (33) 100 (31) 21 (17) 19 (51) 140 (29) 7 (19) 7 (26) 5 (30) 19 (24) 
Western 5 (30) 6 (34) 92 (29) 4 (3) 6 (17) 102 (21) 5 (14) 2 (7) 0 7 (9) 
Total 17 (49) 18 (51) 318 (66) 126 (26) 37 (8) 481 (86) 36 (45) 27 (34) 17 (21) 80 (14) 
The variables are then modelled in order to test how these factors affect the membership of 
FSCs, net income effects of membership and agricultural direct subsidies, and the impact of 
membership and direct subsidies on investment in agricultural inputs and use of machinery. 
Recall that one of the issues we identified in the introduction was that subsidies may only have 
income effects rather than investment and output effects.  
The variables are specified and summarised in Table 4:11  
Table 4 Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics 
The structure of our model is designed to avoid potential problems. For example, some have 
argued that the net income differences between members and non-members of FSCs may not 
be fully attributable to participation in cooperatives (see Karantininis and Zago 2001; Greene 
2008), e.g. individual capability. This suggests that there might be an issue with the endogenous 
variables.  
11  Non-FSC member, migrant, and Western are allowed for based on standard statistical procedures (see 
Freedman 2010)  
Variables Description Mean Std. Dev 
Farmer characteristics related 
EDU Number of years that farmer householder in education 8.04 2.51 
EXP Equal to 1 for farmer householder has at least 6 years in agriculture,  0 otherwise 0.97 0.18 
EDU*EXP Interaction of EDU and EXP 7.74 2.88 
FULLTIME Equal to 1 for full-time farmer, 0 otherwise 0.63 0.48 
PARTTIME Equal to 1 for part-time farmer, 0 otherwise 0.26 0.44 
COOP Equal to 1 for farmer subscribes a FSC, 0 otherwise 0.86 0.35 
COOPFAM Equal to 1 for farmer with reasonable knowledge about farm cooperatives 0.50 0.50 
Farmer business related 
LOGNETINCOME Log of net income (1,000 Yuan) 2.91 1.01 
CASHCROP Equal to 1 for farmer produces cash crop products, 0 otherwise 0.41 0.49 
TRADCROP Equal to 1 for farmer produces traditional cash crop products, 0 otherwise 0.23 0.42 
ROC  Equal to 1 for farmer plants more than once per year, 0 otherwise   0.48 0.50 
NOLOANACC Equal to 1 for farmer does not get access to production loans, 0 otherwise 0.53 0.50 
AGINPUT Purchase value of agricultural inputs in 2009 (1,000 Yuan) 5.73 20.58 
FARMMACH Value of farm machinery (1,000 Yuan) 8.06 29.63 
AGINPUTS AGINPUT+ FARMMACH 13.83 35.66 
Local economic development related 
HOUSEVALUE Local average house value (in 1,000 Yuan) 121.47 194.24 
EASTERN Equal to 1 for farmer located in Eastern China, 0 otherwise 0.52 0.50 
CENTRAL Equal to 1 for farmer located in Central China, 0 otherwise 0.28 0.45 
Government supporting related 
AGSUB Equal to 1 for farmer received agricultural subsidies, 0 otherwise 0.80 0.40 
To address this problem, we use a two-stage treatment effect, since this excludes endogenous 
heterogeneity. In this treatment effect model, the effect of participation in cooperatives on 
farmers’ income is modelled in two stages: 
Where is the net income of farmer , is a vector of variables for farmer  that affects that 
farmer's net income, is an indicator variable equal to one if the farmer participates in a 
cooperative, is a vector variable for farmer  that affects that farmer's decision whether to 
join the cooperative or not, and and are disturbance terms assumed to be distributed 
i.i.d. bivariate normal with zero means. More specifically, the regression equation is as follows：
Where is a vector of exogenous variables that affect farmer households’ net income, which 
are the same as in the first step Zi is the prediction of participation in cooperatives, is the 
subsidy of farmer i, h is the hazard term.12 
Following the usual two-stage treatment effect model, we model the farmer-cooperative 
participation decision variable as:  
Where is a latent variable in a random utility framework equal to the difference in farmer 
indirect utility from a farmer participating in and not participating in a farmer cooperative: 
We then use the standard Heckit estimator to derive estimates for the parameters. 
Results and discussion 
We set out the results following the three areas for analysis previously stated: (1) the factors 
affecting farmer membership of FSCs; (2) the impacts of FSC membership and direct subsidies 
12 The use of an exclusion variable to manage endogeneity in econometric analysis inevitably creates dispute 
regarding what to select and whether one might opt for Heckman correction. See Freedman (2010).  
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on farmers’ net income; (3) the impacts of FSC membership and direct subsidies on the use of 
agricultural inputs and machinery.  
Table 5 summarizes our initial model parameter estimates. It divides into Model 1 and Model 
2 based on the two stage treatment. 
Table 5 Model parameter estimates: membership, subsidies and farmer net income 
Variables 1 2 
LOGNETINCOME COOP=1 LOGNETINCOME COOP=1 
Estimates SE Estimates SE Estimates SE Estimates SE 
EDU 0.105* [0.056] 0.022 [0.034] 0.108* [0.105] 0.02 [0.033] 
EXP 1.354** [0.607] 0.536* [0.317] 1.370** [0.603] 0.550* [0.313] 
EDU*EXP -0.107* [0.057] -0.110* [0.057] 
FULLTIME -0.450** [0190] 1.433*** [0.210] -0.464** [0.184] 1.422*** [0.207] 
PARTTIME -0.306* [0.178] 1.338*** [0.232] -0.322* [0.173] 1.347*** [0.233] 
COOP 0.800*** [0.298] 0.848*** [0.272] 
COOPFAM 0.703*** [0.221] 0.671*** [0.211] 
CASHCROP 0.024 [0.086] 0.438** [0.204] 0.023 [0.092] 0.422** [0.190] 
TRADCROP -0.201* [0.113] 0.096 [0.203] -0.204* [0.113] 0.149 [0.196] 
ROC 0.250*** [0.079] 0.245*** [0.078] 
NOLOANACC -0.143* [0.086] 0.423*** [0.149] -0.147* [0.086] 0.434*** [0.142] 
AGINPUT 0.005*** [0.001] -0.005*** [0.002] 
FARMMACH 0.004** [0.002] 0.008 [0.009] 
AGINPUTS 0.005*** [0.001] -0.004* [0.002] 
HOUSEVALUE 0.002** [0.001] 0.004*** [0.001] 0.002*** [0.001] 0.004*** [0.001] 
EAST 0.331*** [0.091] -0.910*** [0.255] 0.335*** [0.091] -0.882*** [0.254] 
CENTRAL 0.252** [0.121] 0.0442 [0.275] 0.254** [0.117] -0.02 [0.267] 
AGSUB 0.343*** [0.108] 0.427** [0.178] 0.341*** [0.108] 0.407** [0.175] 
INTERCEPT 0.44 [0.668] -1.768*** [0.535] 0.397 [0.665] -1.723*** [0.524] 
ATHRHO -0.739*** [0.272] -0.779*** [0.253] 
LNSIGMA -0.135** [0.062] -0.129** [0.060] 
OBSERVATIONS 561 561 561 561 
1.Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2. Coefficient of ATHRHO and LNSIGMA are significant, indicating necessarily to control the endogeneity bias in the model. 
3. The difference between Model 1 and Model 2 analysis is that in Model 1, AGINPUT and FARMACH are separately assessed while in Model 2, they are
combined into a new variable (AGINPUTS) to represent total agro investment that farmers committed.
(1) Factors affecting farmer membership of FSCs
The factors affecting farmers’ membership (Deng et al. 2010; Zheng et al. 2011, 2012; Yang 
and Liu 2012; Ito et al. 2012) can be classified into two categories: (1) the characteristics of 
farmers such as education level, psychological barriers, time committed to agricultural 
production (i.e. full time or part time farmer), length of engagement (i.e. experience); (2) 
central and local governments’ policies such as promoting FSCs and agricultural subsidies.  
In our study, we first examine what factors contribute to farmer membership of FSCs. This was 
carried out in the first stage of the regression in Table 5, and the results can be referred to in 
the column ‘COOP=1’ for Model 1. With regards to the variables relating to farmer 
characteristics, both full time farmer (FULLTIME) and part time farmer (PARTTIME) 
categories exhibit positive and significant associations with FSC participation. The findings 
also suggest, years of farming experience (EXP) and greater knowledge (COOPFAM) of the 
way in which FSCs function influence membership with 1% of statistical significance. As such, 
our results generally support the findings in the studies referred to in the introduction (and 
below).   
Moving on to characteristics of farming business activities, our findings suggest that farmers 
involved in cash crop activity (CASHCROP) are more likely to participate in FSCs compared 
to farmers breeding livestock, poultry and or fish. This seems reasonable in the sense that one 
can readily perceive the benefits of technical support for cash crops. The results also indicate 
that farmers who invest more in agricultural input are less willing to take part in FSCs as 
AGINPUT has negative and significant effect. This might be due to the fact that farmers with 
high agricultural input use are most likely large scale farmers who have better bargaining power 
when dealing with buyers in the market, and as such their motivation to participate in 
cooperatives may be lower than small scale farmers, based on this variable. The finding also 
suggests that participants’ independent access to finance (NOLOANACC) seems to adversely 
affect cooperative membership. Those with lower levels of access to finance seem to view FSC 
membership as a source of support. In one sense, FSCs seem to be operating effectively, since 
they are acting as a substitute for formal financing. Moreover, the values of agricultural 
machinery exhibit little effect on membership.  
We further assess if there are differences between regions with different economic 
development levels in terms of farmers’ attitudes towards FSC participation. This is because 
research on regional differences in relation to FSCs participation behaviour and benefits has 
largely been neglected in the literature (Cho et al. 2010). The agricultural development does 
not only affect farmers’ characteristics and farmer’ organizations in the region but also leads 
to different agricultural priorities and supporting measurements (e.g. subsidy policies).  
As previously noted there are few regional studies. Yang and Liu (2012) conducted an 
investigation to investigate whether FSCs and agricultural specialisation had improved rural 
income from 2459 villages in 6 provinces in China and concluded that it indicated “great 
significance to rural income growth”. Nevertheless, their data was collected in 2003 when the 
FSC Law had not been in effect. Other studies are found mainly based on cases in one province. 
Examples of these studies such as Zheng et al. (2011, 2012) conducted in Jilin province, Ding 
et al. (2011) in Yunnan province, Cai (2011) in Shandong province and Ito et al. (2012) in 
Jiangshu province.  
Our results in Table 5 show, compared to farmers from western China, farmers living in the 
eastern region (EASTERN) are less likely to join FSCs. The main reason for this seems to be 
that farmers in eastern China have more opportunity to find employment in non-agricultural 
sectors. This region has higher industrialization and a lower proportion of agricultural output 
to GDP (see Table 1, a typical case is Zhejiang province). 
In our study, agricultural subsidies (AGSUB) are a proxy for government support policy (Deng 
et al. 2010). We found farmers receiving subsidies have positive attitudes to participation in 
FSCs, which suggests that the government’s subsidy policy has played a role in encouraging 
farmers’ engagement with agriculture. It seems very likely that this consequence will be more 
effective in the future as the new subsidy of 'Agriculture Support and Protection Subsidy’ 
(including grain subsidy, seed subsidy, and aggregated inputs subsidy) is aimed at supporting 
moderate and large-scale management operators (e.g. cooperatives, large scale farmers, family 
farms and agricultural social service organizations) to encourage large scale farming to use 
farmland effectively and efficiently. Considering the effect relates the promotion of subsidies 
to FSC membership, we would argue that this is evidence that cooperatives and subsidies 
involve complementarities.  
To summarize, statistical analysis of the survey provides new insight into the areas which are 
not very well evidenced in the previous literature. Notably, findings for participation relating 
to regional differences and agricultural subsidies. The analysis also adds further evidence 
regarding general factors influencing farmers’ participation in and behaviour towards FSCs, 
and the complementary effect between FSC membership and government’s direct subsidies.  
(2) The impacts of FSC membership and direct subsidies on farmers’ net income
In the literature, FSCs are found to be effective in raising the level of specialisation (Yang and 
Liu 2012), expanding farmers’ business scope (Zheng et al. 2011) and FSC membership is 
correlated with rural income (Deng et al. 2010; Yang and Liu 2012). However, evidence 
suggests that the level of farmers’ participation in FSCs is low, ranging from 10% (Zheng et 
al. 2012), to 15.5% (Ito et al. 2012). Given this low level of participation, Zheng et al. (2012) 
argued that farmers’ full benefits from joining FSCs might be hard to accurately assess.  
As discussed in the last section, the main intention of farmers’ participation is to improve their 
financial position. As such, in the second stage in Table 5 (see the column of 
‘LOGNETINCOME’ for Model 1), whether the participation and subsidies can benefit farmers 
and what factors contribute to farmers’ net income are analysed. The benefit here is measured 
by farmers’ net income at the end of 2010 in terms of RMB (1000 Yuan). We firstly find that 
education background (EDU) and agricultural experience (EXP) are important factors for 
income generation. This, of course, is what one would expect, given that both create human 
capital, which may augment productivity. Secondly compared to migrant farmers, full-time 
and part-time farmers earn less as both FULLTIME and PARTIME are negative with moderate 
to weak statistical significance respectively, of which full time farmers earn less than migrant 
counterparts. Again, this accords with what one might intuit, it is basic to the reasons why rural-
urban migrants are migrants, in turn affecting the profile of those who remain.  
Thirdly, cooperative membership (COOP) and subsidy receiving (AGSUB) have positive and 
significant effects on farmer income generation. These findings are consistent with other 
studies. For example, Ito et al. (2012) suggested that cooperatives were important for farmers, 
especially for small scale farmers, to improve their economic status. In a study carried out in 
Shangdong province, Cai (2011) also found that the average net income of apple cooperative 
members was higher than that of non-cooperative members. With regards to research on the 
relationship between agricultural subsidies and farmer net income, Huang et al. (2011, 2013) 
and Yi (2015) indicated that subsidies were positive and significant in farmers’ net income.  
Our findings firmly support both Huang et al and Yi.  
In addition, we infer that promoting cooperative membership and allocating agricultural 
subsidies are both important agricultural policies. In combination they are able to provide 
support to farmers in China. This, however, is highly conditional on the actual mechanisms 
used to promote membership, how this becomes participation and whether in fact the recipient 
of subsidies is the current farmer. These, of course, are important institutional issues regarding 
the nuance of rule systems and policy design (see next subsection for more evidence and 
conclusion for additional comment).   
Fourthly, the results also identified that multiple plantings in a year (ROC) would increase net 
income significantly and no loan access (NOLOANACC) would decrease net income. The 
results are reasonable and expected. Fifthly, the coefficients of AGINPUT (farmers’ 
agricultural input investment) and FARMMACH (farmers’ agricultural machinery investment) 
are both positive and statistically significant which indicate that improving technology by 
investing in equipment is an effective method to increase farmers’ income. 
Moving to regional differences in farmers’ net income, the findings suggest that farmers living 
in the eastern region (EASTERN) can earn far more than farmers from western China; and 
farmers from central China (CENTRAL) have higher net income than their peers in western 
regions. The results are consistent with discussions earlier about regional economic imbalance. 
A positive and statistical significance with the coefficient of HOUSEVALUE further suggests 
that commercialization and urbanization play an important role in increasing farmers’ net 
income in China. 
(3) The impacts of FSC membership and direct subsidies on the use of agricultural inputs and
machinery 
Both direct subsidies and FSCs membership have net income effects. However, a further issue 
is whether direct subsidies and FSCs membership also make greater use of agricultural inputs 
and investments in machinery. Intuitively one would expect the answer to be ‘yes’. However, 
previous research has found the opposite to be true, albeit based on highly restricted datasets 
etc.  
For instance, Kirwan (2008) found that farmland owners captured 75 percent of the grain 
subsidy but only 25 percent of them are actually in farming. As argued by Huang Jikun, the 
‘grain subsidy’ and ‘comprehensive input subsidy’ play zero role in encouraging agricultural 
production rather they act as an income subsidy 13 . This debate calls for more evidence. 
Similarly, one might expect that membership of FSCs would lead to greater investment in 
agricultural input and use of machinery, which may involve payment without individual 
ownership or an increase in ownership (a different kind of investment). 14  
In order to explore relations above we rerun our two-stage treatment model. The results are 
reported in Table 6: 
13 http://china.caixin.com/2014-12-30/100769339.html. (accessed 30 July 2015) 
14 Note, one can distinguish the majority of small-scale FSCs operating within a single village or restricted locality 
from large scale and more commercial FSCs of 3 kinds based on consolidation and perhaps vertical integration 
within stages of a supply chain: 1) Production oriented FSCs with a trademarked output and stable sales channels; 
2) Sales and distribution FSCs; 3) Production-processing-marketing FSCs. Those 3 kinds are more capital
intensive than smaller local FSCs and are liable to have more significant associations between FSC status and
investment levels (See Wu 2011). However, these are not the focus of our research.
Table 6 Model parameter estimates: membership, subsidies and farmer agro investment 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
AGINPUT COOP=1 FARMACH COOP=1 AGINPUTS COOP=1 
ESTIMATES SE ESTIMATES SE ESTIMATES SE ESTIMATES SE ESTIMATES SE ESTIMATES SE 
EDU -0.447 [1.188] -0.009 [0.035] 0.814* [0.488] -0.0141 [0.0358] 0.363 [1.306] -0.00974 [0.0353] 
EXP -10.55 [13.38] 0.562* [0.333] 11.58* [5.925] 0.551* [0.334] 0.9 [14.60] 0.558* [0.333] 
EDU*EXP 1.24 [1.60] -1.001* [0.593] 0.243 [1.725] 
FULLTIME 7.674 [4.971] 1.339*** [0.212] -0.361 [1.740] 1.287*** [0.218] 7.183 [5.225] 1.347*** [0.213] 
PARTTIME 3.773 [3.933] 1.344*** -0.233 -0.713 [2.647] 1.323*** [0.235] 2.92 [4.683] 1.348*** [0.234] 
COOP -3.881 [4.848] 7.324** [3.372] 3.881 [6.068] 
COOPFAM 0.888*** [0.165] 0.855*** [0.171] 3.881 [6.068] 
ROC 9.398** [3.775] -2.664 [2.174] 6.764 [4.327] 
NOLOANACC 0.714 [2.077] 0.388** [0.158] -1.322 [2.566] 0.400** [0.156] -0.657 [3.297] 0.393** [0.158] 
CASHCROP -3.539 [3.866] 0.537*** [0.192] -1.091 [2.567] 0.554*** [0.191] -4.674 [4.622] 0.540*** [0.192] 
TRADCROP -10.26*** [3.771] 0.0436 [0.199] 3.113* [1.809] 0.054 [0.198] -7.144* [4.166] 0.045 [0.199] 
EAST 5.690*** [1.390] -0.999*** [0.25] 2.495 [1.649] -1.002*** [0.25] 8.232*** [2.084] -0.999*** [0.251] 
CENTRAL 17.99*** [5.334] -0.074 [0.283] -0.913 [1.731] -0.129 [0.282] 17.06*** [5.583] -0.073 [0.283] 
HOUSEVALU
E 




AGSUB 2.247 [1.714] 0.455*** [0.171] -0.987 [1.577] 0.444*** [0.17] 1.219 [2.259] 0.455*** [0.171] 
INTERCEPT -2.849 [9.902] -1.280** [0.582] -8.925 [5.826] -1.146* [0.591] -11.87 [11.51] -1.291** [0.584] 
ATHRHO -0.124* [0.066] -0.0812 [0.0591] -0.157** [0.069] 
INSIMA 3.344*** [0.252] 3.022*** [0.247] 3.554*** [0.188] 
OBSERVATIO
NS 
561 561 561 561 561 561 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Coefficient of ATHRHO and LNSIGMA are significant, indicating necessarily to control the endogeneity bias in the model. 
Models 1 and 2 separately examine cooperative farmers’ purchasing values in agricultural input (AGINPUT) and agricultural machinery (FARMACH) 
respectively, and Model 3 is the combination of the both as the total value of agro investment (AGINPUTS)
Three findings are revealed in Table 6: 
(1) FSC membership (COOP) does not seem to lead to any greater use of inputs (AGINPUT)
than receipt of subsidies. However, membership does promote use of machinery (FARMACH). 
This finding is consistent with the discussion in the literature and proves that modern FSCs 
have become an important vehicle for facilitating new agricultural technologies (Yang and Liu 
2012; Liang and Hendrikse 2013; Yan and Chen 2013). However:  
(2) The agricultural subsidies received by farmers from FSCs do not help increase investments
either in agricultural input or machineries as AGSUB neither has statistical significance on 
AGINPUT, FARMACH nor on AGINPUTS.  
The results in our sample here provide strong evidence to support Huang et al’s (2011) claim 
that the original purpose of subsidy policy is distorted as agricultural subsidies (in particular 
‘grain subsidy’)15, to some extent become a kind of ‘income subsidy’. Concomitantly, input 
subsidies have been distributed without direct reference to the extent of actual inputs used.  
In both cases, the greater part of the subsidy has income effects without necessarily directly 
improving agricultural production (see Huang et al. 2011; Yi et al. 2015).16 This is reflected 
in our Model 3 regression result. Again, this indicates that some of the potential of the 
combination of FSC membership and subsidies is being dissipated and this is likely an 
institutional issue of design.   
(3) In contrast to farmers living in western region (WESTERN), farmers from the eastern
(EASTERN) and central (CENTRAL) regions significantly invest more in agricultural input 
(AGINPUT) but not in agricultural machineries (FARMACH). The reasonable explanation for 
this finding is that unlike investing in agricultural inputs which closely links to the farmers’ 
financial position, investing in agricultural machinery is more restricted to geographical 
production conditions. That is, whether the land and land use are suitable for using machinery 
or suitable for a particular type of machinery (see Wan and Cheng 2001).   
Conclusion 
As argued in the introduction, research on both cooperatives and subsidies has been limited in 
various ways. Our study goes some way to addressing this. We have considered both 
membership and participation in FSCs and subsidy effects and have done so based on a 
15 As previously noted, the majority farming household subsidy has been for grain, and this has typically been 
distributed to the registered land contractee (who may or may not be the land user). 
16 See also http://china.caixin.com/2014-12-30/100769339.html, accessed 30 July 2015.  
geographically extensive survey that is in various ways representative. Specifically, we have 
modelled the data collected from 35 FSCs and 561 farmer householders in 16 provinces, by 
exploring factors affecting membership of FSCs, net income and agricultural investment 
effects in relation to membership and direct subsidies.  
The findings and the contributions of this paper are threefold. First, with regards to the factors 
affecting membership of FSCs, we found FSCs to be most attractive based on regional 
dynamics (due to contrasting alternative employment potential etc) and where farming is small 
scale and farmers are full-time. In addition, we found farmers receiving subsidies have positive 
attitudes to participation in FSCs, which suggests there are likely complementarity effects 
between cooperative membership and subsidy provision. However, this is limited based on 
other conditioning or contingent factors that affect the design and implementation of policy. 
Clearly, policy is liable to be more effective if it can be targeted at actual farmers rather than 
previous or absent owners and can be focused in ways that maximise potential impact. That is, 
if policy targets subsidies by sector, region and scale of farming. This in fact has begun to occur 
in some ways via the new ‘Agricultural Support and Protection Subsidy’ in 2016 (including 
grain subsidy, quality seed subsidy, and comprehensive input subsidy). This is aimed at 
supporting moderate scale management operators (e.g. cooperatives, large scale farmers, 
family farms and agricultural social service organizations). How this will play out is yet to be 
seen. 
Second, in relation to net income effects of FSC membership and subsidies, our results suggest 
that FSC members earned more than non-members. What is more, subsidies received by 
farmers are important ways of generating income. This is important. It suggests that at 
minimum FSC membership and subsidies together may be a way of balancing out, over time, 
some of the pull factors that are creating the “crisis” in agriculture in China. That is, the rural-
urban divide. This, of course is only one strand of policy for an extremely complex issue but it 
nonetheless should not be neglected. Raising the standards of knowledge skills and 
commitment on a local basis is necessarily a long-term issue of developing effective networks 
that in turn show benefits for participants, creating a virtuous circle of growth that potentially 
affects both food security and rural sustainability. This, of course, is precisely what the state is 
intent upon.  
However, this leads to our third finding. In terms of the agricultural investment effect of FSC 
membership and subsidies, analysis of our survey evidence suggests that despite FSC 
membership contributing to the use of machinery, there is little impact on promoting farmer 
agricultural investment (neither in input nor in machinery). Clearly, more thought needs to be 
given to this issue. It too involves multiple factors and considerations (suggesting both 
institutional reassessment and scope for follow up research, perhaps cross referenced based on 
different methods, see Morgan and Patomäki 2017). Machinery may only be appropriate if land 
and land use allow and if scale makes it cost effective given the relative timing of use of 
machines. Cooperatives provide one way to collectivise costs and risk if they are appropriately 
incentivised and managed, but this requires training, knowledge and skills and then effective 
logistics (if, for example, machinery is required by all participants at approximately the same 
time due to harvest pressures etc). These are barriers that require the development of trust and 
this requires national policy to be locally committed to (for issues of trust see Colledge et al. 
2014). Clearly, time will tell how effective the state is in developing along these lines.   
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